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To finish what I was saying about beauty, said Stephen, the most satisfying relations of the sensible must therefore correspond to the necessary phases of artistic apprehension. Find these and you find the qualities of universal beauty. Aquinas says: *Ad pulcritudinem tria requiruntur integritas, consanantia, claritas*. I translate it so: Three things are needed for beauty, wholeness, harmony, and radiance (Joyce, 1960, p. 211).

The above epigraph comes from the fifth section of *A portrait of the artist as a young man* and is part of a long conversation between Stephen Dedalus and his fat friend, Lynch. As a stark reminder of the ugly material and as a way perhaps of clipping the wings of Icarus before he begins yet another ascent into the realm of theory, we are told that “A long dray laden with old iron came round the corner of Sir Patrick Duns hospital covering the end of Stephen’s speech with the harsh roar of jangled and rattling metal” (1960, p. 208). Nevertheless, on the next page, and in flawless prose, Stephen manages to land his hypothesis, that “…though the same object may not seem beautiful to all people, all people who admire a beautiful object find in it certain relations which satisfy and coincide with the stages themselves of all aesthetic apprehension.”

I could have started this review in any number of places. However, I settled on Joyce because there is a tone of reckless confidence in his articulation of his aesthetic – his philosophy of the beautiful. *A portrait* might be seen as a modernist text, confident (if you ignore the irony) in its sense that there is some kind of correspondence between propositional knowledge and the world of things. Such a tone is at variance with the post-structuralist position occupied (I won’t say “adopted”) by Misson and Morgan in their important book. Propositional knowledge in this book eschews essences, universality and is distinctly provisional and discursively constructed.

In this review, I position myself as a respondent, as someone drawn into a conversation, in some respects interpellated (to use the Althusserian term) but hardly compelled to subscribe to the text’s post-structuralist underpinnings. I will begin by giving some reasons why I think this book is important. Thence I will allow myself the indulgence of diversion. After all, isn’t there something pleasurable about a diversion!

This is an important book

A colleague of mine, reporting on the introduction of a National Qualifications Framework in South Africa, mentioned to me that its most singular and pronounced effect was the “evacuation of content”. I felt immediately envious of the accuracy and precision with which she had described something that is also happening in New Zealand and other countries under the impact of a fetish of discrete, behaviorist, learning
outcomes. The fetish is reflected in ladders of achievement objectives in curriculum statements, and competence-based standards statements in qualifications criteria. The magic of the fetish is its supposed power to provide a simple means of measuring learning and teachers’ ability to teach. Central to the fetish is the discourse of skills and a story about education as commodity.

Commodified educational discourse is dominated by a vocabulary of skills, including not only the word “skill”, and related words like “competence”, but a whole wording…of the processes of learning and teaching based upon concepts of skill, skill training, use of skills, transfer of skills, and so forth…this wording helps to commodify the content of language education, in the sense that it facilitates its division into discrete units, which are in principle separately teachable and assessable, and can be bought and sold as distinct goods in the range of commodities available on the educational market (Fairclough, 1992, p. x).

In New Zealand, at Year 12 (the penultimate year of schooling), students who are deemed to be competent at Achievement Standard 90378: Analyse short written texts, gain three credits towards a National Certification of Educational Achievement. The type of text is not specified. It could be a short story or poem; it could equally be a newspaper column or editorial. In practice, it is seldom a poem (O’Neill, 2006).

It is a truism of post-structural thought that we make the world through naming it. The most powerful nominative gesture in this book is contained in the category: aesthetic text. After the occasional mention, it strides in on p. 35 and thenceforth becomes a prime signifier. (The “literary text” shuffles off in a huff, shrugging its shoulders.) A Google search suggests that the term is not as widely used as one might think. (Umberto Eco is an exception to this.) So what is signified by the irruption of this category into English teaching discourse? Most crucially, there is a displacement of the term “literary” (currently problematised by debates over the canon, and so on) by an equally problematical but maybe more useful term (“aesthetic”), which embodies an expanded justification for reading and composing texts traditionally described as literary. The justification foregrounds a number of elements: response as affect and individually realized, pleasure, beauty, creativity and the body.

Each of these elements is theorized, explored and exemplified in the course of this book. But it is the nominative act I am emphasizing here. A thing of beauty is not necessarily a joy forever, especially in a curriculum that is joyless and which has outlawed beauty as too hard to handle (or measure). This act by Misson and Morgan throws open a door. So let me extend a cordial welcome to the aesthetic text and all it signifies. Stretch out, warm yourself by the fire and let yourself be turned on.

What does the book do? And does it have an argument?

The answer to the second question is yes, and it goes something like this. It’s not a big surprise to see pleasure, the beautiful, the aesthetic, marginalized in conventional
schooling. But isn’t it rather ironical that these things appear to be marginalized by the bees knees of radical, contemporary approaches to the teaching of English, that is, critical literacy. Jeez, it actually appears that reading texts the critlit way is also a bit joyless. After all, if texts are mere products of culture (sorry, poetic genius, there is no room for you at this table!) and do dodgy things like positioning readers to see the world in nasty sexist, racist, classist, heterosexist ways, isn’t the prime aim of reading to resist such machinations! That requires super-rational approaches to reading (utilizing terms from systemic functional grammar) aimed at stripping bare a text’s pretensions. Oops, there goes the baby, and there goes the bathwater. There goes the pleasure. Is there no room for pleasure any more? What has happened to delight? Well, it’s at risk. So what we need to do is to try to pin down what aesthetic delight is and to find a way of accommodating it to critical literacy or (as this book ultimately does), accommodate critical literacy to it! Indeed, on its final page, in a statement that resonates (for me) with Huck Finn’s famous assertion of his preparedness to go to Hell, the authors write:

It might be said that this new version of critical literacy is no longer critical literacy at all. So be it. If, indeed, the reconfiguring has produced something that is no longer recognizable as critical literacy, then we will need to find a new name (2006, p. 226).

Well, my own view is that we don’t need to find a new name. But it could be handy to sever the link between critical literacy and doctrinaire versions of post-structuralism. Which takes me back to the start of the book.

The book begins with an introduction that sets out the authors’ key assumptions and decisions, the most noteworthy of which is the following:

It will be noted that the poststructuralist framework is never questioned, or even explicitly argued for, but implicitly the whole book is making the case that poststructuralism provides the best framework we have for understanding texts and their relationship to human society and identity (p. x).

A longer title for this book might have been “A poststructuralist view of the aesthetic and its relationship to critical literacy”. That, I think, encapsulates the intent. However, as I will be suggesting, there are many places where this text behaves badly and subverts, undermines, questions the framework. In poststructuralist terms, the assumption of the framework is the sine qua non for the gaps and contradictions which emerge in this book. And for me, it is these gaps and contradictions – the divine slippages in logic – which have been totally fascinating and which have triggered my own copy’s lavish marginalia which testify to my own engagement with the issues raised.

Chapter 1, with its historical overview of what has happened to constructions of English and literacy, might be thought of as a justification for the book on historical grounds. That is, it identifies a problematic in the current moment, which calls for a revisiting of the aesthetic. “Chapters 2 and 5 as a group develop a view of the aesthetic and the reading of aesthetic texts within the kind of poststructuralist framework that is underpinning critical literacy” (p. xviii). Chapter 2 grapples with issues of definition, while Chapter 3 explores how the aesthetic, so defined, is implicated in the effects of
discourse (Foucault’s “power”). Chapter 4 explores the role of the aesthetic in the construction of human subjectivity. Chapter 5 revisits familiar territory in critical literacy theorizing, that is, the nature of resistant and complicit readings of texts. (Morgan and Misson use the term “alignment” for the latter.) Chapter 6, with one eye on the contemporary educational milieu, makes a case for the value of the aesthetic (again, asserting that it will do this from a poststructuralist position). Chapters 7 and 8 explore two aspects of the aesthetic which, on the face of it, appear to sit awkwardly with critical literacy as commonly theorized and practised, that is, the body and the productive (and its concomitant pleasures). Chapter 9, I imagine, is the sort of chapter that will find its ways into books of course readings. It provides a useful overview of pedagogical strategies that emerge from earlier discussions. Finally, in Chapter 10, we arrive at an argument for reconfiguring critical literacy (though, as suggested earlier, I see it more as a reconfiguring of the poststructuralist assumptions that the book is undesirous of questioning).

**What is the aesthetic and where is it located?**

The word *aesthetic* signifies the formal organization of sensory properties. Aesthetic properties seem to have an intrinsic, irreducible value – a value distinct from conceptual and affective values. That irreducible character is most evident in abstract plastic art, that is, in art that concerns itself solely with the formal organization of visual and tactile properties such as colour, shape, mass, and texture (Carroll, 1995, p. 106).

The problem of location is spelled out clearly by Misson and Morgan: “Part of the reason why the aesthetic is so hard to define is that it is so hard to locate, or rather, it is located across a process involving various elements, and there is no way to determine which aspect is most important” (p. 33). If we return to the James Joyce quotation with which I began this review – “…though the same object may not seem beautiful to all people, all people who admire a beautiful object find in it certain relations which satisfy and coincide with the stages themselves of all aesthetic apprehension” (1960, p. 209) – we can see that he, too, is grappling with the issue of location. Locating beauty in the object is problematical because not everybody finds the same object beautiful. Joyce’s solution is to locate the aesthetic in a particular kind of *apprehension*, which “finds” certain “relations” in a particular object (wholeness, harmony, radiance). Beauty is not so much in the eye of the beholder as in a particular kind of beholding that is nonetheless dependent on particular qualities in its object. Misson and Morgan begin the chapter “Defining the aesthetic” with a similar solution by calling it a “way of knowing”. Indeed, in words which are out of kilter with the poststructuralist framework, they refer to a “way of knowing” as “the *essential* feature of the aesthetic” (p. 26) [my italics].

What immediately follows is some useful discussion of the aesthetic in relation to some traditional binaries: universal/particular, material/numinous, emotional/intellectual, inspirational/control, individual/traditional, content/form and such words as beauty and pleasure. The issue of location or locus returns with a discussion of “The aesthetic as process”. “Commonly,” they write, “the aesthetic entails a creator, the work created, and
an audience” (p. 33). Why commonly? Well, it is clear that aesthetic experience is not necessarily textual or to do with humanly created artifacts, since we can “take aesthetic pleasure in naturally occurring phenomena” (p. 34). The second part of the chapter contains a discussion of the aesthetic in relation to the work, the maker and the responder. The logic is clear, except that it runs the risk of suppressing considerations of the aesthetic as relationship, for example, as an object/viewer relationship.

It is clearly important to the developing argument to have a section here on “The aesthetic work”. Joyce needs it so he can anchor such concepts as wholeness, harmony and radiance (drawn from Aquinas) in the properties of an object. The authors need the notion of an aesthetic work so that they can write sentences such as: “There are often certain obvious formal features in a text that mark it as available for aesthetic reactions” (p. 35). The tendency to locate the aesthetic in certain properties of the object has an extreme formulation in the quotation from James Carroll (above, in the epigraph to this section of the review). Such an extreme formulation, of course, cannot be countenanced within a poststructuralist framework. The phrase “available for aesthetic reactions” maintains a stance, which prefers to locate the aesthetic in the responder (having the cake) while allowing for conversations that address the features of an art object as aesthetic stimuli (and eating it).

The fact that there is a section on “The artist” is interesting in itself. It is a kind of proclamation that the author is still alive, as one whose aesthetic way of knowing has become skillfully embodied in a particular art object for all to enjoy (at least potentially).

We now arrive at “The reader” and the idea that the aesthetic is a “product of reading” (p. 39). I guess it was always going to be problematic to call the aesthetic a way of knowing. What is wonderful about this book is that such an assertion necessarily invites the rejoinder: What do you mean by know? To what extent is this knowing unconscious or conscious? How does aesthetic knowing occur? Whose knowing is it? And how does new knowing or knowledge get produced. Adherence to a poststructuralist framework requires particular kinds of responses to such questions:

Even at the level of formal elements, perception of significance and beauty is culturally bound. It may be true that some basic ingredients such as repetition and contrast are basic elements in the texts that all cultures perceive as aesthetic; however, the ability to perceive and take pleasure in these elements within particular texts is largely determined by the culture in which they are being produced and how compatible its understandings are with those of the culture in which they are being read. To experience the aesthetic is not a natural ability but shows a considerable degree of cultural sophistication, a point easily shown since the forms of the aesthetic are so culturally specific (p. 41) [my italics].

If the aesthetic is a way of knowing, then it is inevitably and inextricably bound up with ideology. There are two ways in which this is so. First, in making us see the world in particular ways, it draws our attention to and makes us value certain things, such as emotion, individual experience. Second, by involving us affectively, it creates attitudes and orients us into reacting positively or negatively towards the actions, ideas, or attitudes represented in the text (p. 43).
These quotations in a number of ways are at the centre of this book. Culture determines knowledge and knowing, and if the aesthetic is a way of knowing, then the aesthetic is culturally determined. Ideology is implicated in all knowing. The aesthetic, then, is a vehicle for ideology and its workings in texts and reader responses need to be exposed. Hence the relationship to critical literacy, which is the book’s project. I agree with all of this except for its absolutism.

So, to engage in some contestational play, I need to say that I don’t think that all knowledge (I like the term human “sense-making”) is culturally determined. Nor do I believe that the aesthetic is necessarily bound up with ideology. Indeed, the reason I have italicized the word “largely” above (as modal qualifier) is because room appears to be being left for an aesthetic response that is not culturally determined. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that I am sympathetic to discourses which identify an evolutionary biological basis to aesthetic response. This is the discourse that James Carroll (above) operates out of. Indeed, a quoted extract from Carroll’s book prompted me to write the poem below:

**The achievement of a hand ax**

Picture this man:
    his uncalloused hand hefting
lovingly the yellow worked flint
    of a remote age
pausing in the clasp &
    unclasping of the stone
    the tendering of fingers on edges
pausing in the apperception of
    ghostly emanations from
a long-vanished mind
    that left an eloquent legacy
defying barriers of time and tongue –
a stunningly impracticable relic
from an incalculably brutish and dangerous world
    beyond utilitarianism
embellished with a virtuoso’s elegance:
What is transmitted
    is the model of a mind

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2 It *may* be that the authors also agree with this. On p. 46, they write: “Language is inherently social. If there were no society, there would be no need for language: we would just know things.” As I read this sentence, it is allows for knowledge that is not social.

3 Carroll’s stance on poststructuralism is exemplified by the following vituperation: “…the intellectual corruptions of poststructuralist theory are integral with ideological corruptions, that the liberationist rhetoric of poststructuralism is tainted with its own kinds of bigotry, narrow-mindedness, and fanaticism, that self-righteous political pronouncements very often serve as a refuge for cynical and hypocritical self-promotion, and that, even when they are generous and sincere, poststructuralist ideological commitments are deficient in wisdom – in completeness and balance and, most important, in adequate understanding of human nature” (1995, p. 11).

4 For a flash version of the poem which “uncovers” its source, see http://www.hyperpoetics.ac.nz/Genres/Prelude/Achievement2.html
wistful, inarticulate yet gripped
by a shadowy aesthetic
lingering
like the man who pauses
over his adept handiwork.

This room to move beyond the pale of cultural determination can be accessed readily enough if one moves outside of a poststructuralist framework or at least outside of extreme versions of such. This book does not avoid issues of individual agency. As stated, the author is not dead here. And there is a place for agency beyond socially constructed subjectivities.

One non-poststructuralist discourse which attempts to address questions of agency and creativity (and hence productive aspects of the aesthetic) is related to gestalt psychology and texts that have been influenced by it. Misson and Morgan use the word “gestalt” from time to time in their book, but are clearly not writing out of the discourse represented by the following quotation:

We believe that the free interplay of the faculties, concentrating on some present matter, comes not to chaos or mad fantasy but to a gestalt that solves a real problem….We speak of creative adjustment as the essential function of the self (or better, the self is the system of creative adjustments) (Perls, Hefferline & Goodman, 1951, pp. 246-7).

In this discourse and its epistemology, the old self-other binary is collapsed and human sense-making is viewed as a function of the boundary between organism and experience. The emphasis is more biological than cultural. I like it because it provides a place to stand outside of culture or at least to decentre culture as prime epistemological determinant – inconceivable in poststructuralist thought.

It also provides an alternative way of approaching the relationship between critical literacy and complex literary narratives, a relationship that Misson and Morgan explore in a fascinating way in the discussion of To kill a mockingbird. Is the author of a complex literary narrative so discursively bound that his/her representations of discursive positions within the narrative form are contaminated by his/her authorial frame? Or is there sufficient agency for an author to shed valuable light on the discursive positions and their relations represented in the narrative? Maybe in the end, these are not absolute alternatives. In a play like King Lear, Shakespeare, I argue, plays the role of critical discourse analyst in his portrayal of the discursive positions occupied by Edmund and Gloucester. I find myself trusting his portrayals. I don’t know for sure where his sympathies lie. I suspect he is more interested in plots (events, choices and their consequences). The value (truth and pleasingness) of a discourse is determined by its effects, the argument seems to run. In the structure of plot, Misson and Morgan would argue, the hidden hand of discourse reveals itself and hence the existence of an authorial frame. To contaminate. Unless art really does/can imitate nature. And there is a nature that determines culture rather than vice versa.
I want to do two more things before drawing the curtain on this review essay. I’d like to share a reflective account of a recent teaching episode (since I would not have reflected in this particular way, if I hadn’t read this book). And I’d like to talk about the body.

Symbols and productive pleasures

The following account comes out of a class on teaching poetry with pre-service teachers here at Waikato University where I work. The topic is symbolism. In a textbook I wrote in 1998, I came up with a number of definitions:

**Symbol:** A concrete image or emblem, which signifies a literal object which remains implicit.

**Conventional (public) symbol:** A symbol whose meaning is fixed by the conventional usages within a culture.

**Private (personal) symbol:** A symbol which has had a particular meaning attached to it by an individual user or writer.

At the time of writing, I wouldn’t have seen these definitions as particularly controversial. However, the post-structuralist framework underpinning this book would contest the conventional/private distinction I’ve made here or at least draw attention to ways in which individual uses or interpretations of symbols are culturally determined.

The activity I set my students was based around the William Blake poem, “The sick rose” (unreferenced, since it’s widely available):

O Rose, thou art sick.
The invisible worm
That flies in the night
In the howling storm

Has found out thy bed
Of Crimson joy:
And his dark secret love
Does thy life destroy.

Students were grouped for a task which required them to construct a narrative that would explain the symbolism of this poem. This is an activity that I’ve used with students for years and I can say that no group has ever duplicated the narrative of another. What does tend to occur is intense competition between groups about their narratives and a willingness to defend interpretations through a range of ingenious stratagems. On this occasion, one group came up with an interpretative narrative based around an incestuous relationship between a father and daughter. Hearing them present their narrative, I was struck by its coherence, by its comprehensiveness (that is, all images in the poem were explained) and by a sort of “Eureka” quality. Interestingly, other groups readily succumbed to the power of this interpretation, expressing a preference for this one over

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6 Wholeness, harmony and radiance, perhaps!
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their own. Meanwhile, the group in question appeared very pleased with themselves. (I’ll be returning to the word “please” and its derivations in the next section of this essay.)

• It has always been interesting to me that students from relatively homogeneous backgrounds come up with such varied interpretations. (They find it interesting also.)
• It is interesting to me that the narrative the students came up with involves an ugly story yet somehow this fact seems barely relevant to the pleasure associated with the activity.
• I wonder what this tells us about the social and psychological operations of images and symbols. My colleague, David Whitehead, who knows a lot about cognitive neuroscience, assures me that all interpretation is ultimately culturally determined. All or which makes me curious about interpretative variance.
• I am struck by the way students enjoy the activity. Where does the enjoyment lie? I think it lies in the problem-solving nature of the task and in the way in which the solution emerges and is evaluated. The task clearly involves reading and writing; or responding and producing. I think the pleasure comes from the enjoyment of a particular kind of elegance: the elegance of a particular kind of solution or story. Enter the aesthetic. They were pleased with themselves. They found their solution pleasing. And so did others.
• There is still room in all of this for a critical “reading” of the resultant narrative and the way it constructs reality, as per a critical literacy approach. However, the strategy can be seen as part of a teaching repertoire rather than constituting it.

Which brings us to the body and a poet whose popularity seems to be undiminished in classrooms where poetry is still taught: William Carlos Williams.

Enter the body

All art is sensual. Listen…never mind, don’t try to work it out. Listen to it. Let it come to you. Let it…sit back, relax and let the thing spray in your face. Get the feeling of it, get the tactile sense of something, something going on. It may be that you will then perceive, have a sensation that you may later find will clarify itself as you go along. So that I say, to understand the modern poem, listen to it, and it should be heard. It is very difficult sometimes to get it off the page but once you hear it then you should be able to appraise it. In other words, if it ain’t a pleasure, it ain’t a poem.

I can’t reference this quotation. It’s transcribed from a reading that I know Williams delivered in New York somewhere, when he was an old man (he’d come out of the critical cold) addressing an audience that clearly loved him to bits. I don’t blame him for his obvious enjoyment of the adulation. He’d well and truly served his time. I’m using it here as a kind of counterpoint to the material covered in Misson and Morgan’s terrific
Chapter 7 on “The aesthetic and the body” which they begin, in no uncertain terms, by asserting that “the aesthetic must be returned to the body” (p. 131). What’s particularly valuable about this chapter is the way the body is theorized in relation to poststructuralist views of the body as bearing (in all senses of the word) discursive inscriptions.

The value of the chapter to me lies in its affirmation of topics that in my own view lie at the heart of the aesthetic as pleasuring. The first of these is rhythm. I occasionally tell my students that in all my years at university, apart from the odd reference to iambic pentameter, the rhythmic qualities of language were never discussed. The message seemed to be that such qualities were either irrelevant or too hard to talk about. I used to wonder about line-breaks in non-metrical poetry and how they got there. I eventually found an explanation in a Denise Levertov interview. She told her interviewer:

I regard the end of a line, the line break, as roughly equivalent to half a comma, but what that pause is doing is recording nonsyntactic hesitations, or waitings, that occur in the thinking-feeling process. This is where the dance comes into it. You can’t get this onto your tape, but I can sort of demonstrate it for you [stands, and moves to the centre of the room]. You see, in the composition of a poem, thinking and feeling are really working together, as a kind of single thing, although they often get separate in other areas of one’s life (Packard, 1970, p. 89).

It is instructive that Levertov brings her entire body into play as she attempts to model her explanation. What is foregrounded here is the body’s role in human meaning-making. She starts with a process that she views as organic – thinking and feeling working in consort. Emotion (and its intimate connection with “motion”) is at the heart of it and, in terms of the aesthetic of the body, potentially finds a way into classroom discourse. The outcome is a particular kind of syntactical arrangement, notated through line-breaks, spaces, drop-lines, indentations and other means.

The link to syntax, I would argue, is the breath. Emotion to feeling, feeling to breathing, breathing to syntax. But syntax guided by sustained acts of attention or interior listening, reflected in poems like Williams’ “Burning the Christmas greens” (wonderfully delivered in the address I mentioned above) and in the pauses (represented by the dashes) in Emily Dickinson’s poems. With the breath (and the body) restored to its central place in the teaching of aesthetic composition and response (however defined), the word “inspiration”, with all its wonderful cultural associations and its biological basis can be restored to its proper place with its status refreshed. But more than that, as Williams reminds us, the senses need to be given their due also. I don’t know whether he deliberately used the word “sensual” rather than “sensuous”, but if he did, he was being really subversive. Can we allow the “sensual” in from the cold into our contemporary classrooms? Even the sensuous feels a bit risky, but Misson and Morgan would tell us that it needs to be done. “Oh for a life of sensations, rather than thought,” Keats once

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7 In her very first letter to Thomas Wentworth Higginson on April 16, 1862, Dickinson asked: “Are you too deeply occupied to say if my verse is alive?...Should you think it breathed, and had the leisure to tell me, I should feel quick gratitude.” Higginson couldn’t handle the dashes and after her death edited them out of his edition of her poems.
said, trusting (like Williams above) that if you give yourself to the sensation, clarification will follow in due course.

In conclusion, then, I would recommend a reading of this book because it puts a spotlight on the aesthetic as a subject valuable in its own right but, more critically, as an antidote to a lot of what is currently happening in English classrooms. It raises important questions about the relationship of the aesthetic to critical literacy. With a huge amount of honesty and candour, it fronts up to critical literacy, in theory and in practice, calls it to account and exposes its limitations. For me, by virtue of its gaps and contradictions, it also asks questions about the value of poststructuralism as a frame and its necessary connection with critical literacy. Above all, let me say, it was a real pleasure to read.

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